Introduction
Consider economic exchange through the Internet. July 18, 2007, was the end date on which to purchase a copy of the first edition of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern at eBay from the seller "bibliomonster" for U.S.$1,900.00. The item had a fixed price listing (using eBay's "Buy It Now" option) and could be purchased only without bidding in an auction. Assume that the seller did own the copy, that the description of the copy was accurate ("Bound in original publishers red cloth a bit rubbed at head of spine. Black (ink?) mark on top board. Minor shelf wear, else very good. Internally, clean and free of ink, marginalia and soiling. No dog-eared pages or tears. Includes the often missing corrigenda leaf. A nice, collectable copy."), and that the accompanying photos were not misleading. Assume that a buyer existed who would have preferred purchasing the copy as described for the price mentioned. The buyer had to pay the price before the seller would ship the book. Thus, the buyer had to trust the seller that the copy would indeed be shipped. If the buyer decided not to pay, there would be no transaction. If the buyer decided to pay, the seller had to decide whether or not to ship the copy.
As a benchmark scenario, imagine an "isolated encounter"-that is, a oneshot transaction in the sense that buyer and seller of the book have never done business with each other before, do not expect to do business with each other in the future, and that verifying the seller's identity is prohibitively costly for the buyer. For the benchmark, imagine further that eBay would not maintain its feedback forum that allows buyers to evaluate sellers, with evaluations being publicly available and easy to access. As a second and less artificial scenario for buying antiquarian books, consider that websites of antiquarian booksellers typically offer indications of their identity, such as information on the physical location of their shop. Imagine, too, that the buyer has purchased antiquarian books from the seller in the past, and the seller expects that the buyer may also purchase such books in the future. Finally, consider a third scenario that takes a core feature of the eBay platform into account-namely, eBay's feedback forum, which provides information on the seller from other buyers. On July 16, 2007, the seller of the first edition of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior had positive feedback from 386 other eBay members and negative feedback from 5 members, resulting in an eBay feedback score of 381, with 98.7 percent positive feedback.
Our example of the purchase of a first edition of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior represents a trust problem between the buyer and the seller in Coleman's sense (1990: 97−99) , with the buyer in the role of the trustor and the seller in the role of the trustee. Coleman emphasizes four points that characterize a trust problem: (1) Placing trust by the trustor allows the trustee to honor or abuse trust, while this alternative is not available for the trustee without placement of trust. In the example, if the buyer decides to buy, the seller can ship the copy of the first edition or can abstain from shipping. In addition, while Coleman does not mention this explicitly, it is important that the trustee has not only an opportunity but also an incentive to abuse trust. For example, the seller could change his or her virtual identity and offer the book once again through the Internet. (2) Compared to the situation with no trust placed, the trustor is better off if trust is placed and honored but is worse off if trust is abused. The buyer prefers to purchase the first edition to, say, owning only the 1980 Princeton paperback edition, while owning the paperback only is most likely still preferred by the buyer to paying U.S.$1,900.00 without receiving the first edition. Again in addition to Coleman's characterization, the trustee is better off if trust is honored than if no trust is placed. Selling the book for U.S.$1,900.00 is profitable for the seller. (3) There is no "real commitment" (ibid.: 98) of the trustee to honor trust. Thus the trustor voluntarily places resources in the hands of the trustee. In the benchmark scenario, since the buyer cannot verify the identity of the seller, the buyer is not able to enforce shipment of the copy after payment. (4) There is a time lag between placement of trust by the trustor and the action of the trustee. The buyer first pays the price and, subsequently, the seller decides on whether or not to ship the book.
In the benchmark scenario resembling a one-shot transaction, it seems intuitive that incentive-guided and goal-directed behavior of trustor and trustee implies that the trustee would indeed abuse trust, if trust is placed. Assuming that the trustor anticipates this, the trustor does not place trust in the first place. If trust is not placed, however, both trustor and trustee are worse off than when trust is placed and honored. Technically speaking, the no trust outcome is Pareto-suboptimal. As Rapoport (1974) aptly put it, individual rationality in the sense of incentive-guided and goal-directed behavior can lead to collective irrationality in the sense of Pareto-suboptimality. Such a "conflict" between individual and collective rationality is the core feature of a social dilemma, and trust relations are a paradigmatic example of a social dilemma involving two actors. While "social dilemma" is a label commonly used in social psychology and also sociology, such a situation is often referred to as a "problem of collective action" or the "tragedy of the commons" in political science and as a "public goods problem" in economics (see Ledyard 1995: 122) .
Social dilemmas are intimately related to the problem of order in Parsons's sense (1937) . After all, in Hobbes's "naturall condition of mankind" (1991 [1651] : ch. 13), actors are interdependent in a world of scarcity, while binding and externally enforced contracts are unfeasible. They may thus end up in the "warre of every man against every man." In that situation, the life of man is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short," and everybody is worse off than in a peaceful situation. This is a social dilemma among many actors. Parsons (1937: 89−94) posed the challenge to specify conditions such that individually rational actors solve the problem of order. He thus referred to the problem of order as "the most fundamental empirical difficulty of utilitarian thought" (ibid.: 91). In his meanwhile classic early contribution to rational choice social research, Coleman (1964: 166−67) clearly realized the challenge and formulated it even more radically than Parsons: "Hobbes took as problematic what most contemporary sociologists take as given: that a society can exist at all, despite the fact that individuals are born into it wholly self-concerned, and in fact remain largely self-concerned throughout their existence. Instead, sociologists have characteristically taken as their starting point a social system in which norms exist, and individuals are largely governed by those norms. Such a strategy views norms as the governors of social behavior, and thus neatly bypasses the difficult problem that Hobbes posed . . . . I will proceed in precisely the opposite fashion . . . . I will make an opposite error, but one which may prove more fruitful . . . . I will start with an image of man as wholly free: unsocialized, entirely self-interested, not constrained by norms of a system, but only rationally calculating to further his own self interest."
While it is part of the sociological folklore that Parsons's challenge focuses on how rational choice social research can cope with social dilemmas, it is less well appreciated that Durkheim put forward a similar argument in his analysis of the division of labor in society (1973 [1893] : bk. I, ch. 7) that relates to the antiquarian book example. Durkheim's point is that economic transactions often deviate from what is conventionally assumed in standard neoclassical models of spot exchange on perfect markets. Durkheim argued that the governance of transactions exclusively via bilateral contracts requires that the present and future rights and obligations of the partners involved in the transaction are specified explicitly for all circumstances and contingencies that might arise during and after the transaction. Anticipating much of the modern economic and game-theoretic literature on incomplete and implicit contracts, Durkheim pointed out that such purely contractual governance of economic transactions is problematic: typically, many unforeseen or unforeseeable contingencies could or actually do arise during or after a transaction. Negotiating a contract explicitly covering all these contingencies would be unfeasible or at least prohibitively costly. Likewise, renegotiations in the case that contingencies arise are also costly (for similar arguments on the limits of contractual governance, see Weber 1976 Weber [1921 : 409 in his sociology of law). Such renegotiations characteristically offer incentives for opportunistic behavior, since an unexpected contingency will often strengthen the bargaining position of one partner while weakening the position of the other. Hence Durkheim argues that mutually beneficial economic exchange presupposes the solution of a trust problem and thus involves a social dilemma.
Game-theoretic models have emerged as a tool for the analysis of social dilemmas in rational choice social research. This is not accidental. Interdependence between actors is a core feature of a social dilemma. For example, the behavior of the trustor has effects for the trustee, and vice versa. Game theory is the branch of rational choice theory that models interdependent situations, providing concepts, assumptions, and theorems that allow specifying how rational actors behave in such situations. The theory assumes that actors behave as if they try to realize their preferences in decision situations with restrictions, taking their interdependencies as well as rational behavior of the other actors into account (see, for example, Harsanyi 1975: 89−117) . It is therefore natural that applications of game-theoretic models figure prominently in rational choice social research on social dilemmas. Moreover, one should observe that interdependencies between actors and actors taking their interdependencies into account are likewise the core of Weber's famous definition of social action (1947: 88, emphasis added): "Sociology . . . is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects . . . . Action is social in so far as . . . it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course." This is a reason why social dilemmas are a strategic research site not only for rational choice social research but also for sociology in general, and why game theory is an important tool, too, for sociological analyses in the spirit of Weber.
Reviews of social dilemma research are readily available that highlight how social psychological theory and other approaches with a firm basis in methodological individualism can be used in this field that differ from rational choice assumptions (for example, Kollock 1998) . Somewhat suprisingly, though, there is no systematic review of applications of game theory in this field with a focus on how sociologically informed hypotheses can be derived from these models, and how these hypotheses fare in empirical research. This chapter contributes to filling that gap. We do so by reconstructing research strategies that are often employed in applications of game theory for the analysis of social dilemmas, as well as reconstructing core assumptions and implications, including testable hypotheses. The chapter is analytical in nature, trying to structure the field, rather than providing a general overview of and comparison with alternative theories. Suggesting that theoretically and empirically informed middle range theory on social dilemmas has emerged from applications of game theory in this field, empirical insights generated by theoretical models are a core topic of the chapter. In the spirit of Goldthorpe's plea (2000: ch. 5) for an alliance between rational action theory (RAT) and the quantitative analysis of data (QAD), we explore how research in this field can contribute to narrowing the gap between rational choice models and empirical research (Green and Shapiro 1994) . The review emphasizes that relevant empirical research in the field includes survey designs, quasi-experimental designs, and more qualitative case studies in addition to experimental designs. Such a "multimethod" perspective conceives QAD broadly and is particularly appropriate when it leads to testing similar hypotheses with complementary empirical designs, thus providing an indication of the robustness of empirical findings.
This Handbook (see Introduction) focuses on two strategies through which rational choice theory has been extended beyond the highly stylized assumptions of neoclassical economics-namely, atomized interaction on perfect markets of rational and selfish actors with full information. One strategy involves making the assumptions on the actors more complex by relaxing the rationality assumption or the selfishness assumption (see Gächter's chapter in this Handbook on how this strategy can be usefully employed for improving on standard models and applications of game theory in rational choice social research). The other strategy aims at using more complex and more appropriate assumptions on the social context by replacing the assumption of atomized interactions on perfect markets. This chapter highlights the second strategy. It does so by combining strong assumptions on individual rationality with assumptions on the "embeddedness" of action in ongoing relations and networks of relations, showing that embeddedness crucially affects behavior of rational actors in social dilemmas. This is in line not only with Coleman's heuristic advice (1987) to combine robust assumptions on rational behavior with more complex assumptions on social structure. Also Granovetter (1985) advocated precisely such a combination of assumptions in his often cited programmatic sketch. Granovetter's criticism of the shortcomings of the neoclassical model of perfect markets with atomized actors has often been taken to imply that one had better abandon rational choice models in favor of more "realistic," socially inspired models of man. It has been widely overlooked, though, that Granovetter sharply opposes "psychological revisionism," characterizing it as "an attempt to reform economic theory by abandoning an absolute assumption of rational decision making" (ibid.: 505). Rather, he suggests maintaining the rationality assumption: " [W] hile the assumption of rational action must always be problematic, it is a good working hypothesis that should not easily be abandoned. What looks to the analyst like nonrational behavior may be quite sensible when situational constraints, especially those of embeddedness are fully appreciated" (ibid.: 506). He argues that investments in tracing the effects of embeddedness are more promising than investments in the modification of the rationality assumption: "My claim is that however naive that psychology [of rational choice] may be, this is not where the main difficulty lies-it is rather in the neglect of social structure" (ibid.). This chapter explores the potential of such an approach for the analysis of social dilemmas.
We use trust problems as a paradigmatic example of social dilemmas, sometimes indicating generalizations of results for other types of social dilemmas. Trust problems involve two actors. We thus largely neglect social dilemmas involving many actors (see Gächter's chapter in this Handbook for some references, as well as the chapter by Kiser and Powers). We illustrate how game-theoretic tools can be used for modeling trust problems and other social dilemmas and sketch the logic of deriving testable hypotheses from game-theoretic models. We then turn to theory and hypotheses on how social structure-that is, embeddedness of a trust problem or, more generally, embeddedness of a social dilemma-affects behavior in such situations. The review of empirical research takes stock of evidence for and against hypotheses on embeddedness effects, with an emphasis on results obtained from complementary research designs and an emphasis on applications to the Internet economy and other economic exchange that resembles a social dilemma. Some directions for future research are also suggested.
Trust in Isolated Encounters
Game theory provides tools for the analysis of situations with interdependence of two or more actors: choices of an actor affect the other actor(s), and vice versa. We sketch the analysis of trust situations in different social contexts, without elaborating on game-theoretic principles underlying the analysis.
2 Consider the standard Trust Game (Camerer and Weigelt 1988; Dasgupta 1988; Kreps 1990; Snijders 1996: chs. 1−4; Buskens 2002 : chs. 1−3), which models trust problems as outlined above. The game (see Figure 3 .1) involves two actors, the trustor and the trustee. The game starts with a move by the trustor, who can choose between placing or not placing trust. If trust is not placed, the interaction ends and the trustor receives payoff P 1 , while the trustee receives payoff P 2 . If trust is placed, the trustee chooses between honoring and abusing trust. If the trustee honors trust, the payoffs for trustor and trustee are R i > P i , i = 1,2. If trust is abused, the payoff for the trustor is S 1 < P 1 , while the trustee receives T 2 > R 2 .
The Trust Game models the benchmark scenario of a one-shot transaction between a buyer and a seller of an antiquarian book. The buyer is the trustor and chooses between placing trust by paying the price for the book and not placing trust by not buying. The seller is the trustee, who can honor trust by shipping the book or abuse trust by not shipping. Under standard gametheoretic assumptions, the payoffs in the game represent utilities for the actors, there is common knowledge implying that all actors know that all actors know all elements of the game, and the actors are rational in the sense that they maximize utility, given their expectations on the behavior of other actors. Using game-theoretic tools, one can then find a solution for the Trust Game. Such a solution implies equilibrium behavior-that is, each actor plays a best reply, given the behavior of the other actor(s) (Nash 1951) . Under these assumptions, it is easy to see that the trustee would abuse trust if the trustor would place trust. The trustor, being able to anticipate this, will not place trust. This equilibrium is indicated by double lines in The Trust Game (S 1 < P 1 < R 1 , P 2 < R 2 < T 2 ).
A slightly more complex model of a trust problem is the Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing 2000; Barrera 2005 ). Again, the game is played by two actors. However, while in the Trust Game the actors make binary choices, in the Investment Game the trustor now chooses the degree to which the trustee will be trusted, and the trustee chooses the degree to which that trust will be honored. More precisely, the trustor has an endowment E 1 and chooses an amount M 1 to send to the trustee (0 ≤ M 1 ≤ E 1 ). This "investment" M 1 is then multiplied by m > 1, and the trustee receives mM 1 . The parameter m can be seen as indicating the trustee's returns resulting from the trustor's investment. Subsequently, the trustee chooses an amount K 2 to return to the trustor, with 0 ≤ K 2 ≤ mM 1 . Afterward, the game ends with the trustor receiving V 1 = E 1 − M 1 + K 2 and the trustee receiving V 2 = mM 1 − K 2 . While M 1 indicates how much the trustor trusts the trustee, K 2 indicates how trustworthy the trustee is. Both the Trust Game and the Investment Game represent the time lag between placing trust and the trustee's response. In both games trust is risky because the trustor regrets being trusting if the trustee turns out not to be trustworthy. The games thus model risks for the trustor in the sense of "opportunistic" or "strategic" behavior of the trustee, who has an incentive for abusing trust.
How to use game-theoretic models for generating empirically testable hypotheses on social dilemmas? For answering this question, one can use Coleman's scheme (1990: ch. 1; see also Raub, Buskens, and Van Assen 2011) for relating macro-and microlevel propositions in social science explanations (see Figure 3 .2). First, the specification of the game includes social conditions in the sense of opportunities and restrictions for the actors' behavior represented by the top-left node of Coleman's scheme. The specification of the game also comprises assumptions on "independent variables" of rational choice theory, such as preferences of the actors that are represented by the actors' payoffs. These are the microlevel assumptions related to the bottom-left node of Coleman's scheme. Furthermore, the specification of the game includes assumptions on macro-micro transitions that are summarized by the vertical arrow 1 in Coleman's scheme: note that the specification of the game models how an actor's payoffs and information depend on social conditions. For example, an actor's payoff function is a function of the possible choices of all actors-that is, a function of interdependencies.
Thus, the specification of a game refers to empirical assumptions on the macrolevel of social conditions, on the microlevel of the actors' preferences and information, and on macro-micro transitions. Rationality assumptions are microlevel assumptions that are summarized in Coleman's scheme by arrow 2. These are assumptions such as that the solution has to be an equilibrium. Game-theoretic analysis then comprises deriving propositions on equilibria of the game and on properties of these equilibria. This allows one to derive implications concerning the behavior of rational actors. These implications are represented by the bottom-right node in Coleman's scheme. In a final step, one can derive propositions on macrolevel effects-for example, on Paretooptimality or suboptimality of the outcomes that result from the behavior of the actors. We illustrate below the derivation of hypotheses along these lines for trust situations under different social conditions.
We briefly consider trust in isolated encounters. Two actors play the Trust Game once and only once. Neither the two actors, nor other actors, can condition behavior in future interactions on what happens in the Trust Game. Isolated encounters are hardly a standard feature of interactions in social and economic life. After all, eBay's feedback forum implies that buyer and seller are not involved in an isolated encounter. Hence, isolated encounters are typically studied in the laboratory and are used to study nonstandard assumptions on preferences, because other factors such as the social embeddedness can be controlled in the laboratory. More precisely, assume that subjects play the Trust Game from Figure  3 .1, with payoffs S 1 < P 1 = P 2 < R 1 = R 2 < T 2 in terms of monetary incentives or points converted into money at the end of the experiment. As explained above, the standard prediction is no trust, and, if trust were to be placed anyway, it would be abused. For the Investment Game, the analogous prediction is that the trustor sends nothing and, if the trustor were to send anything, the trustee would never return anything. Clearly, these are very strong predictions for the behavior of any subject in the laboratory. The predictions are clearly rejected (see Snijders 1996; Keren 1999, 2001 , on the Trust Game; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995, on the Investment Game; and Camerer 2003: ch. 2.7 , for an extensive review).
Experiments show that substantial percentages of subjects trust in the Trust Game and send positive amounts in the Investment Game. Also, many subjects in the role of trustee honor trust and return substantial amounts. More generally, opportunism is not ubiquitous in isolated encounters resembling a social dilemma. Different approaches can be envisaged that account for such empirical regularities (see Fehr and Schmidt 2006 for an instructive overview). Each of these approaches involves making the assumptions on the actors more complex in one way or the other. First, one could relax the rationality assumption and employ a bounded rationality perspective. For example, one could assume that subjects are used to repeated interactions in life outside the laboratory. As we will see below, placing and honoring trust as well as other forms of cooperative, nonopportunistic behavior can be a result of equilibrium behavior in repeated interactions. The assumption then is that subjects erroneously apply rules in isolated encounters that are appropriate when interactions are repeated (see Binmore 1998 for a sophisticated discussion of such approaches). Second, there are approaches that maintain the rationality assumption but modify the selfishness assumption. These approaches thus abandon the assumption that subjects care exclusively about their own material resources ("utility = own money"). Rather, it is assumed that subjects, or at least some subjects, have other-regarding preferences. It is quite often argued (see, for example, Fehr and Gintis 2007 ) that such preferences are the result of socialization processes and internalized social norms and values. Also, it is often assumed that subjects may differ with respect to their other-regarding preferences-there may be selfish subjects as well as subjects with other-regarding preferences-and that subjects are incompletely informed on the preferences of other subjects.
To get the flavor of how assumptions on other-regarding preferences can be used to account for placing and honoring trust in a Trust Game as an isolated encounter, consider a simple version of a social preferences model-namely, Snijders's guilt model (1996; see also Keren 1999, 2001 ), a simplified version of the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion. Assume that actor i's utility is given by U i (x i ,x j ) = x i − β i max(x i − x j , 0) with monetary payoffs x i and x j for the actors i and j and β i ≥ 0 a parameter representing i's guilt resulting from an inequitable allocation of monetary payoffs. Hence, in a Trust Game with payoffs in terms of money and P 1 = P 2 and R 1 = R 2 , the trustee's utility from abused trust would be T 2 − β 2 (T 2 − S 1 ), while utilities correspond to own monetary payoffs in all other cases. Furthermore, assume actor heterogeneity with respect to the guilt parameter β i in the sense that there are actors with a large guilt parameter, while β i is small or even equals zero for other actors-namely, those with selfish preferences. Finally, denote by π a trustor's belief of the probability that the trustee's utility from abusing trust is smaller than his utility from honoring trust-that is, T 2 − β 2 (T 2 − S 1 ) < R 2 . Equilibrium behavior now requires that a trustee with β 2 > (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − S 1 ) honors trust, while a trustor places trust if π > (P 1 − S 1 )/(R 1 − S 1 ). We can assume that placing trust becomes more likely when the condition π > (P 1 − S 1 )/(R 1 − S 1 ) becomes less restrictive. Similarly, we can assume that honoring trust becomes more likely when the condition β 2 > (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − S 1 ) becomes less restrictive. Furthermore, we can assume that π depends on the trustee's incentives and hence decreases in (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − S 1 ). It follows from this model that the likelihood of placing trust decreases in the trustor's risk (P 1 − S 1 )/(R 1 − S 1 ), as well as in the trustee's temptation (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − S 1 ), and that the likelihood of honoring trust decreases in the trustee's temptation (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − S 1 ). These implications correspond with experimental evidence (see Snijders 1996; Keren 1999, 2001) .
Obviously, assumptions on other-regarding preferences should be used with care (see Camerer 2003: 101; Fehr and Schmidt 2006: 618) : (almost) all behavior can be "explained" by assuming the "right" preferences and adjusting the utility function. Thus, one would prefer first of all parsimonious assumptions on other-regarding preferences, adding as few new parameters as possible to the model. Second, when assumptions on other-regarding preferences are employed, one should aim at using the same set of assumptions for explaining behavior in a broad range of different experimental games. Third, one should not only account for well-known empirical regularities but also aim at deriving and testing new predictions. It is therefore important from a methodological perspective that the same set of assumptions on other-regarding preferences is consistent with empirical regularities of behavior not only in Trust Games but also in other social dilemmas, in games involving distribution problems such as the Ultimatum Game (Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze 1982; see Camerer 2003 for a survey), or the Dictator Game (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; see Camerer 2003 for a survey), and in market games.
We refer to Gächter's chapter in this Handbook for a careful discussion of how to refine the model of rational and selfish actors (another useful overview for sociologists is Fehr and Gintis 2007) . In the subsequent sections we return to employing standard assumptions on the level of individual behavior-namely, assumptions on game-theoretic rationality as well as basically selfish preferences. We now refine a standard assumption on the social context in neoclassical economics. Rather than assuming atomized interactions-in our case, "isolated encounters"-we explore the implications of "embeddedness" for rational and selfish behavior in social dilemmas.
Theory and Hypotheses on Effects of Social Embeddedness
Roughly, embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) can mean that the actors involved in a focal Trust Game maintain an ongoing relation with prior and expected future interactions. We refer to this as dyadic embeddedness. An example is the second scenario for the purchase of the antiquarian book in which the buyer repeatedly purchases from the same antiquarian. Furthermore, a focal Trust Game can be related to interactions of trustor or trustee with third parties. We refer to this as network embeddedness. The buyer of the antiquarian book may happen to know others who purchase books from the antiquarian, or may obtain third-party information about the antiquarian's behavior in the past through an institution that enhances network embeddedness. An example is our third scenario for purchasing the antiquarian book where eBay's feedback forum provides network embeddedness for the transaction.
We distinguish two mechanisms, control and learning, through which dyadic and network embeddedness may affect trust. Control refers to the case in which the trustee has short-term incentives for abusing trust, while some long-term consequences of his behavior in the focal Trust Game depend on behavior of the trustor. More precisely, if the trustee honors trust in the focal Trust Game, the trustor may be able to reward this by applying positive sanctions in the future. Conversely, if the trustee abuses trust in the focal Trust Game, the trustor may be able to punish this by applying negative sanctions. Given dyadic embeddedness, the trustee has to take into account that honoring trust in the focal Trust Game may affect whether or not the trustor places trust again in the future. Given network embeddedness, the trustee has to take into account that a trustor can inform third parties about the trustee's behavior in the focal Trust Game, such as other trustors with whom the trustee may be involved in future Trust Games. Again, whether or not other trustors are willing to trust the trustee may depend on honoring or abusing trust in the focal Trust Game. Thus, the trustee has to trade off the short-term incentives to abuse trust against the long-term benefits of honoring trust and the long-term costs of abusing trust. This mechanism is also known as conditional cooperation (Taylor 1987) or reciprocity (Gouldner 1960; Blau 1996 Blau [1964 ; Diekmann 2004) . Reciprocity in this sense (sometimes labeled "weak reciprocity"-see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt 2006: 620; Fehr and Gintis 2007) can be driven exclusively by long-term, "enlightened" self-interest of the actors. Thus reciprocity in this sense differs fundamentally from reciprocal behavior of the trustee in isolated encounters based on other-regarding preferences ("strong reciprocity").
Embeddedness may affect trust through a second mechanism-namely, learning. The trustor need not be completely informed on the behavioral alternatives and incentives of the trustee. Beliefs by the trustor on the trustee's characteristics can be affected by information regarding past interactions. This information can be obtained from past interactions of trustor and trustee-that is, through dyadic embeddedness. Given network embeddedness, information can also be obtained from third parties who have interacted with the trustee in the past. If a trustee has been trustworthy in past interactions, a trustor might be more convinced that the trustee will be trustworthy again in the focal Trust Game than if information on untrustworthy behavior of the trustee in the past has been revealed. Table 3 .1 summarizes our distinction between dyadic and network embeddedness, as well as between learning and control (Buskens and Raub 2002; see Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994 : 138−39 for a similar discussion of learning and control effects through network embeddedness).
Our sketch indicates that embeddedness may help actors to mitigate social dilemmas such as trust problems (see Taylor 1987; Kollock 1998 for an overview of different ways in which social dilemmas can be mitigated). Note that embeddedness effects on social and economic interactions and exchange are a common theme of the sociological literature. However, clearly disentangling different types of embeddedness effects and the underlying mechanisms theoretically as well as empirically is often neglected. We now show how gametheoretic tools allow for modeling embeddedness and, more important, for deriving hypotheses on effects of embeddedness on trust. This can be done by "embedding" a focal Trust Game in a more complex game. Subsequently, one establishes conditions for an equilibrium of the more complex game such that trust is placed and honored in the focal Trust Game. Propositions on such conditions yield hypotheses on embeddedness effects on trust.
To see how trust can be a result of purely selfish rational actors who are "enlightened" in the sense that they take long-term effects of their behavior into account, we consider a model of control effects through dyadic Sanctioning possibilities of the trustor that involve third parties.
Types of Embeddedness and Mechanisms through which Embeddedness Affects Trust
Learning Information about the trustee from past experiences of the trustor.
Information about the trustee from third parties.
embeddedness-namely, Kreps's model (1990) of a repeated Trust Game (see also Gibbons 2001) . In this model, the Trust Game is played repeatedly in rounds 1, 2,…, t,… By way of example, a buyer purchases repeatedly from the same seller of antiquarian books. More precisely, after each round t, another round t + 1 is played with probability w (0 < w < 1), while the repeated game ends after each round with probability 1 − w. The focal Trust Game is thus embedded in a more complex game in which the Trust Game is repeated indefinitely often. In each round, trustor and trustee observe each other's behavior. In the repeated game, an actor's behavior in each round t may depend on the behavior of both actors in the previous rounds. An actor's expected payoff for the indefinitely repeated Trust Game is the discounted sum of the actor's payoffs in each round, with the continuation probability w as discount parameter. For example, a trustor who places trust throughout the repeated game, with trust being honored throughout, receives payoff R 1 + wR 1 + … + w
. Thus, using the apt label coined by Axelrod (1984) , the continuation probability w represents the "shadow of the future": the larger w, the more an actor's payoff from the repeated game depends on what the actor receives in future rounds.
In the indefinitely repeated Trust Game, the trustor can exercise control by employing conditional behavior that rewards a trustee who honors trust in a focal Trust Game by placing trust again in future games. Conversely, conditional behavior of the trustor can imply punishing the trustee's abuse of trust in the focal Trust Game by not placing trust in at least some future games.
If the trustor uses weak reciprocity in the sense of implementing conditional behavior, the trustee can gain T 2 rather than R 2 in the current Trust Game by abusing trust. However, abusing trust will then be associated with obtaining only P 2 in (some) future encounters with no trust placed by the trustor, while honoring trust will result in larger payoffs than P 2 in those future encounters if the trustor goes on placing trust. Moreover, the larger the shadow of the future, the more important are the long-term effects of present behavior. Thus, anticipating that the trustor may employ conditional behavior, the trustee has to balance short-term (T 2 − R 2 ) and long-term (R 2 − P 2 ) incentives. It can be shown that weak reciprocity can be a basis for rational trust in the sense that the indefinitely repeated Trust Game has an equilibrium such that trust is placed and honored in each round. Consider conditional behavior of the trustor that is associated with the largest rewards for trustworthy behavior of the trustee and with the most severe sanctions for untrustworthy behavior. This is realized if trust is placed in the first round and also in future rounds, as long as trust has been placed and honored in all previous rounds. However, as soon as trust is not placed or abused in some round, the trustor refuses to place trust in any future round. Straightforward analysis shows that always honoring trust (and always abusing trust as soon as there has been any deviation from the pattern "place and honor trust") is a best reply of the trustee against such conditional behavior of the trustor if and only if
This condition requires that the shadow of the future is large enough compared with (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − P 2 ), a convenient measure for a selfish trustee's temptation to abuse trust. The condition refers exclusively to the incentives of the trustee and not at all to the incentives of the trustor.
3 This highlights that placing and honoring trust in the indefinitely repeated Trust Game is driven by the strategic interdependence of the actors.
If condition (1) applies, the indefinitely repeated Trust Game has an equilibrium such that trust is always placed and honored. Enlightened selfinterest can thus be a basis for trust among rational actors in the sense of placing and honoring trust being equilibrium behavior. 4 The equilibrium, however, is not unique. For example, never placing trust, while placed trust would always be abused, is always an equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game. The "folk theorem" (see, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Rasmusen 2007: ch. 5 .2) for repeated games implies that the indefinitely repeated Trust Game has many other equilibria, too, for large enough w. Thus, an equilibrium selection problem emerges. A typical, though sometimes implicit, argument in the literature on equilibrium selection in this context is "payoff dominance." An equilibrium is payoff dominated if there is another equilibrium that is associated with higher payoffs for at least some actor and is not associated with lower payoffs for any actor. In the indefinitely repeated Trust Game, an equilibrium that implies placed and honored trust throughout the game is evidently not payoff dominated by other equilibria, while the notrust-throughout equilibrium is payoff dominated.
Rather than claiming that actors indeed follow the very strict behavioral rules described above, we can use condition (1) to derive more qualitative predictions about behavior in the indefinitely repeated Trust Game. If one proceeds from the observation that condition (1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibria in the indefinitely repeated Trust Game such that trust is placed and honored throughout the game, one could then assume that placing and honoring trust becomes more likely when the condition becomes less restrictive. This leads directly to testable hypotheses on control effects through dyadic embeddedness. Specifically, one would expect that the likelihood of placing and honoring trust increases in the shadow of the future w and decreases in the temptation (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − P 2 ) for a selfish trustee.
The results for the indefinitely repeated Trust Game can be generalized. For example, analogous results hold for an indefinitely repeated Investment Game. Friedman (1971 Friedman ( , 1990 shows that analogous results apply to a broad class of indefinitely repeated 2-and n-person games. Roughly speaking, if a social dilemma is repeated indefinitely often and the shadow of the future is large enough relative to the short-term incentives of the actors, there exists an equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game such that the actors cooperate: the equilibrium of the repeated game induces a Pareto-optimal outcome and a Pareto-improvement compared with the Pareto-suboptimal solution of the original dilemma. Of course, these generalizations should be interpreted with care. For example, conditional behavior requires the observability of the behavior of other actors. Hence, the underlying assumption that each actor receives reliable information on each other actor's behavior in each round of the game is crucial, while such an assumption will often be rather problematic from an empirical perspective in games with many actors (see Bendor and Mookherjee 1987) .
Models of repeated Trust Games can be extended to account for control effects resulting from network embeddedness in addition to dyadic embeddedness. In these extended models, the trustee interacts with a set of trustors, while the trustors are connected through a network that allows for communication about the behavior of the trustee. The focal Trust Game is now embedded in a more complex game that comprises Trust Games of the trustee with different trustors. The important feature is that the trustor in a focal Trust Game can transmit information on the trustee's behavior in that game to other trustors. Next to direct reciprocity exercised by the trustor who interacts personally with the trustee in the focal Trust Game, network embeddedness allows for indirect reciprocity exercised by other trustors. A trustee contemplating honoring or abusing trust in a focal Trust Game now has to consider future sanctions by the trustor with whom he interacts in the focal Trust Game, as well as sanctions that can be applied by other future trustors who receive information on the trustee's behavior in the focal Trust Game and who may condition their future behavior on that information. In terms of our example of purchasing antiquarian books, we thus now consider variants of an eBay feedback forum.
First, such network embeddedness can be a substitute for dyadic embeddedness (see Kreps 1990: 106−8) . Assume that the trustee interacts with a different trustor in each round of the indefinitely repeated Trust Game in the previous section. Thus each trustor plays the Trust Game only once with the trustee. Dyadic embeddedness is then removed completely from the repeated game and has been replaced by network embeddedness. However, if the trustor in a given round is reliably informed of what has happened in previous rounds, all trustors can condition their behavior in a given round in the same way as a trustor who plays in each round: trust is placed if and only if there is no information that trust has not been honored before. Evidently, the trustee's best reply against such behavior of the trustors is again to honor trust in each round if condition (1) is fulfilled. Conversely, placing trust is indeed then the best reply behavior also for the trustors. Hence, we see that network embeddedness can induce trust among rational and selfish actors.
Dyadic as well as network embeddedness is included in more complex models (for example, Weesie, Buskens, and Raub 1998; Buskens and Weesie 2000a; Buskens 2002: ch. 3; see Raub and Weesie 1990 for a related model of network embeddedness for the Prisoner's Dilemma). In these models, a trustee interacts with a trustor in an indefinitely repeated Trust Game. After the interaction with a given trustor ends, the trustee goes on playing an indefinitely repeated Trust Game with another trustor, while information on behavior in the Trust Games with the first trustor is communicated to the second trustor with some probability. Interactions with a third trustor start after the interactions with the second trustor have ended, and so forth. These models are relatively general and allow for quite some heterogeneity with respect to various features: the incentive T 2 for abusing trust varies between games, the probability of starting interactions with the trustee as well as the continuation probability for these interactions varies between trustors, and the probability of information transmission varies between pairs of trustors. One can then study equilibria such that trustors place trust if T 2 is not "too large" and if they do not have information that trust has ever been abused. A nice feature of these models is that they account for the intuition that trust will not always be placed. In addition to hypotheses on how the likelihood of trust is affected by the shadow of the future and the short-term incentives of the trustee, such models allow for deriving hypotheses on effects of network characteristics. Specifically, the likelihood of placing and honoring trust in a focal Trust Game increases in the density of the network of trustors as well as in the trustor's outdegree-that is, the probability that the trustor will transmit information to the next trustor who interacts with the trustee. This is intuitively plausible, since network density as well as outdegree increase the sanction possibilities of the trustor. Hence, if the trustee thinks in terms of long-term consequences, higher network density and outdegree allow for placing and honoring trust even if the trustee's short-term incentive to abuse trust is fairly large.
A problem of these models is that they assume that information is reliable and that incentive problems associated with the supply of information are neglected (see Lorenz 1988; Raub and Weesie 1990: 648; Williamson 1996: 153−55; Blumberg 1997: 208−10; Buskens 2002: 18−20) . However, supplying information on the trustee's behavior is a contribution to a public goodnamely, enforcing trustworthy behavior of the trustee. Such contributions are problematic: after all, public good production is itself a social dilemma when contributions are costly (this feature is often discussed as a major problem of institutions such as eBay's feedback forum; see Bolton and Ockenfels 2009). Moreover, information from third parties can be inconsistent with one's own experiences. Also, information from third parties can be problematic because of misunderstanding or strategic misrepresentation: imagine that the trustors are competitors who purchase the same goods from the same seller. In a nutshell, one would expect that effects of network embeddedness are attenuated when such problems become more serious. Notice, too, that we have focused on the case of network control in the sense that other trustors can sanction the trustee in future interactions. This is control through "voice," in Hirschman's sense (1970) . A different case of network control is that a trustor has access to alternative trustees and can exercise control through "exit": whether or not the trustor interacts again with the trustee in the future depends on the trustee's behavior in the focal Trust Game. Modeling network control through exit opportunities for the trustor is not trivial (see Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 1989; Schüßler 1989; Vanberg and Congleton 1992 for related models), but one would expect in general that the likelihood of placing and honoring trust increases in the trustor's exit opportunities.
The game-theoretic models of embeddedness effects on trust discussed above have been (repeated) games with complete information: roughly speaking, each actor is informed on the behavioral alternatives and incentives of all actors. Specifically, trustors are completely informed on the behavioral alternatives and the incentives of the trustee. Hence, there is no need-and no opportunityfor trustors to learn during the game about unobservable characteristics of the trustee. This means that these models do not yield hypotheses on learning effects of embeddedness.
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Hypotheses on control as well as learning effects can be derived from models of games with incomplete information. Typically, these are models of finitely repeated games. To get a flavor of these games, consider first of all a finitely repeated game with complete information. Assume that trustor and trustee play the Trust Game from Figure 3 .1 repeatedly-namely, N times. Clearly, in the final round, equilibrium behavior requires that trust would be abused and no trust will be placed. This means that behavior in the last but one round cannot have effects on behavior in the final round. Hence, no trust will be placed in the last but one round and so forth, back to the first round. This backward induction argument shows that placing and honoring trust cannot be a result of rational and selfish behavior in a finitely repeated Trust Game with complete information.
Things change by introducing incomplete information in the finitely repeated Trust Game (see Camerer and Weigelt 1988; Dasgupta 1988; Neral and Ochs 1992; Bower, Garber, and Watson 1997; Buskens 2003) . Introducing incomplete information means relaxing another core assumption of the standard rational choice model. Assume that there is a positive ex-ante probability π that the trustee actually has no incentive to abuse trust-that is, his payoff from abusing trust is T 2 < R 2 (an alternative assumption leading to essentially the same results would be to assume that the trustee has no opportunity to abuse trust with probability π). The trustor knows the probability π but cannot directly observe whether the trustee's payoff from abusing trust is T 2 or T 2 . Now, if the trustor places trust in some round of the repeated game that is not the final round, trust may be honored for one of two very different reasons. First, the trustee's payoff could be T 2 < R 2 so that there is no incentive at all for the trustee to abuse trust. Second, the trustee's payoff could be T 2 > R 2 but the trustee follows an incentive for reputation building. The trustee knows that if he abuses trust, the trustor can infer for sure that the trustee's payoff from abusing trust is T 2 > R 2 and will thus never place trust again in future rounds. On the other hand, if the trustee honors trust, the trustor remains uncertain about the trustee's incentives and may place trust again in the future. Conversely, the trustor can anticipate such behavior of the trustee and may therefore indeed be inclined to place trust. In this game the trustor can control the trustee, in that placing trust in future rounds depends on honoring trust in the current round and the trustor can learn about the incentives of the trustee from the trustee's behavior in previous rounds. The result is a subtle interplay of a trustor who tries to learn about and to control the trustee, taking the trustee's incentives for reputation building into account, and a trustee who balances the long-term effects of his reputation and the short-term incentives for abusing trust, taking into account that the trustor anticipates on this balancing.
It can be shown that the game has an equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982 ) that does involve placing and honoring trust in some rounds of the repeated game. More precisely, in that equilibrium, the game starts with trust being placed and honored in a number of rounds. Afterward, a second phase follows in which the trustor and the trustee with T 2 > R 2 randomize their behavior until the trustor does not place trust or the trustee abuses trust. After trust has not been placed or has been abused for the first time, the third and last phase starts, in which no trust is placed until the end of the game. A remarkable feature of the model is that quite some honored trust can be induced by equilibrium behavior even if the probability π that the trustee has no incentive to abuse trust is small. In the equilibrium, learning occurs-in the sense that the trustor updates her belief about the probability that she is playing with a trustee without an incentive to abuse trust-if trust is abused, and in the second phase as long as trust is honored. Learning is rational in the sense of Bayesian updating. The first phase of the game with trust being placed and honored is shorter, the higher the risk (P 1 − S 1 )/(R 1 − S 1 ) for the trustor, the smaller the number of rounds of the repeated game, and the smaller the ex-ante probability π. While the risk for the trustor is a driving force of the model, the trustee's temptation (T 2 − R 2 )/(T 2 − P 2 ) only affects behavior in the second randomization phase of the repeated game. Quite counterintuitively, the probability that the trustor places trust in that phase increases (!) in the trustee's temptation (see Buskens 2003 : 239 for an explanation).
Game-theoretic models with incomplete information such as the finitely repeated Trust Game are complex. They become even more complex by including learning resulting from network embeddedness. A shortcut linking learning effects of network embeddedness to such models would be to assume that the trustor's ex-ante probability π of interacting with a trustee who would never abuse depends on information the trustor receives from third parties such as other trustors who played Trust Games previously with the trustee. Specifically, based on information diffusion models in networks of trustors (see, for example, Buskens 2002: ch. 4) and assuming that the information about the trustee is positive (it is information that the trustee has honored rather than abused trust), one would expect that the ex-ante probability π increases in the density of the network of trustors as well as in the extent to which the trustor in the focal Trust Game receives information about the trustee from other trustors-that is, increases in the trustor's indegree.
A more explicit game-theoretic model of network effects in games with incomplete information has been provided by Buskens (2003) . In that model, the trustee plays Trust Games with two different trustors, A and B. With some probability, each trustor can inform the other trustor on the trustee's previous behavior. We can conceive of the probability that trustor A transmits information to trustor B as A's outdegree and B's indegree (and vice versa). Thus, trustor A controls the trustee through her outdegree and learns from B about the trustee through her indegree. If each trustor transmits information to and receives information on the trustee from the other trustor with sufficiently high probability, the first phase of the repeated game such that trust is placed and honored becomes longer and in this sense network embeddedness increases trust. Counterintuitively, in the randomization phase, the probability of placing trust decreases (!) in the probabilities of information transmission.
Summarizing and interpreting the results of the game-theoretic models for learning effects through dyadic and network embeddedness yields the hypotheses that the likelihood of placing and honoring trust decreases in the trustor's risk (P 1 − S 1 )/(R 1 − S 1 ) and increases if the trustor's previous experiences with the trustee are positive (the trustee honored trust) rather than negative (the trustee abused trust). Furthermore, assuming that the trustor receives positive information about the trustee from other trustors, the likelihood of placing and honoring trust increases in the density of the network of trustors, and in the trustor's indegree. These are relatively robust hypotheses that lend themselves also to empirical research outside the laboratory. The counterintuitive hypotheses on behavior in the randomization phase of the games are clearly best tested in lab experiments.
Models for control and learning effects of embeddedness in games with incomplete information are not only problematic in that they use very strong assumptions on the actors' rationality including rational (Bayesian) updating of beliefs. These models are also problematic in that they neglect learning on other features than unobservable characteristics of the trustee. For example, a trustor could try to use information received from other trustors for inferring how to reasonably cope with trust problems. Also, past interactions may give rise to other effects than exclusively learning. For example, actors may have pledged investments in their relation through past interactions, and these investments affect the incentives in the focal Trust Game.
The attractive feature of game-theoretic models involving incomplete information is that control and learning can be analyzed simultaneously. The price tag attached to these models is a set of rather strong assumptions on the actors' rationality. Alternatives are "pure" learning models in which actors adapt their behavior based on past experiences. Actors try to optimize short-term outcomes, while not (or "hardly") looking ahead. This implies, too, that actors do not take other actors' incentives into account (see Camerer 2003: ch. 6 for a useful overview of learning models; Flache 1995, 2002; Flache and Macy 2002 provide applications to social dilemmas; Buskens 2002: ch. 4 is an example of a model of learning in networks). Hence, these models neglect control effects. Typically (see Buskens and Raub 2002: 173−76) , learning models yield hypotheses that the likelihood of placing trust decreases in the trustor's risk (P 1 − S 1 )/(R 1 − S 1 ). Also, the trustor's estimation of the probability π that trust will be honored will typically increase with positive information about the trustee's behavior in previous interactions, be it information from the trustor's own previous interactions with the trustee or information from third parties. Therefore, one would again hypothesize that more positive information increases the likelihood of placing trust. Table 3 .2 summarizes the hypotheses discussed in this section.
Empirical Research on Effects of Social Embeddedness
We organize our overview of empirical evidence on effects of social embeddedness by type of research design, focusing on evidence closely related to the hypotheses summarized in Table 3 .2. First, lab experiments are used for testing hypotheses on embeddedness effects (see Cook and Cooper 2003 for an overview of experimental studies on how other elements in the social context can affect trust). Experiments allow for control over the variation in important independent variables, and the causal relation between manipulations and outcome differences is mostly obvious. The disadvantage is that setups are often rather artificial. Subjects are typically students who are engaged in abstract interactions. This questions external validity. Therefore, evidence from settings beyond the lab is a complement to experimental evidence. In the second part, we thus review evidence from survey studies, with some emphasis on evidence from on-line transactions. It is typically difficult to disentangle learning and control effects of embeddedness in these studies. We conclude our overview with a brief sketch of two vignette experiments that were specifically designed to overcome this problem. Clearly, vignette experiments have their limitations, too. For example, incentives for subjects are problematic, since vignette designs involve hypothetical decisions in hypothetical situations. One may thus conclude that it makes sense to employ different and complementary research designs, each having specific strengths and shortcomings, for testing hypotheses on embeddedness effects in order to assess the robustness of empirical findings.
Effects of dyadic embeddedness
Camerer and Weigelt (1988) initiated experimental research that aims at carefully testing hypotheses on behavior in finitely repeated Trust Games with incomplete information, with follow-up studies by Neral and Ochs (1992) , Anderhub, Engelmann, and Güth (2002) , and Brandts and Figueras (2003) . See Camerer (2003: 446−53 ) for a more detailed overview of these experiments. 6 While experiments on one-shot Trust Games focus on payoff effects and reveal that these effects, in particular effects of risk and temptation, are strong, experiments on repeated Trust Games focus on embeddedness effects. Experiments confirm that trust as well as trustworthiness are high in early rounds and decrease when the end of the repeated game approaches (dyadic control). Trust is almost absent after any abuse of trust, while trust remains relatively high as long as trust has been honored (dyadic learning). However, the trustor's tendency to place trust as long as trust has been honored does not increase as the end of the game comes nearer. This is consistent with the theory, since trustors have to realize that trustees with an incentive to abuse trust also have an incentive to make trustors believe that they do not abuse trust, while these trustees will in fact abuse trust toward the end of the game. Brandts and Figueras (2003) also find that trust and trustworthiness increase with the probability that a trustee has no incentive to abuse trust. Summarizing, the equilibrium described above for the finitely repeated Trust Game predicts quite some global patterns of behavior reasonably well. However, the experiments of Neral and Ochs (1992) , Anderhub, Engelmann, and Güth (2002) , and Brandts and Figueras (2003) also show that behavior of subjects does not completely follow the predicted equilibria. For example, it is predicted that in the second phase of the game in which trustors and trustees with an incentive to abuse trust both randomize, the probability that trustors trust increases (!) with the temptation for the trustee to abuse trust. This implication is not only counterintuitive but also inconsistent with experimental findings.
Results from some other experiments are quite in line with these findings. Gautschi (2000) reports findings for finitely repeated Trust Games that comprise two or three rounds of play. He finds that positive past experience matters (dyadic learning) and that the number of remaining rounds to be played also increases trust (dyadic control). For a more contextualized setting with buyers and sellers and an incentive structure similar to the Trust Game, Kollock (1994) finds similar evidence. Still, the studies by Gautschi and Kollock report quite some untrustworthy behavior by trustees very early in the games. This can be explained by the difference that subjects in the studies of Gautschi (2000) as well as Kollock (1994) play relatively few games, while subjects in the studies by Camerer and Weigelt (1988) and the related follow-up studies play very many games. Camerer and Weigelt (1988) as well as their followers analyze mainly the later games in the experiment. In this way, suboptimal behavior is minimized. For example, if trustees build up more experience, they "learn" that they actually earn less if they behave opportunistically too early. In the studies by Gautschi (2000) and Kollock (1994) , subjects have much less opportunities for this type of learning.
Engle- Warnick and Slonim (2004, 2006) compare finitely and indefinitely repeated games. In principle, the trustor's opportunities to exercise control in an indefinitely repeated game with constant continuation probability are the same in round t and in round t + 1. Still, the authors find decreasing trust over time in such games. However, this decrease is much smoother than in the finitely repeated games. This can be understood in the sense that learning effects in terms of negative experiences reduce trust over time, and subsequently trust seems to be difficult to restore. On the other hand, trust remains reasonably high because control opportunities do not diminish over time and enable some pairs to continue to trust each other. An additional explanation for decreasing trust in indefinitely repeated games might be that subjects believe that after many repetitions of the game the probability increases that a specific round will be the last one, even if experimenters do their very best to make it apparent that the continuation after every round is constant (for example, by using a publicly thrown die).
While there are many experiments on the Investment Game, only few use the finitely repeated Investment Game. The findings of Cochard, Nguyen Van, and Willinger (2004) are in line with empirical regularities that have been found for the Trust Game. Subjects send more in the Investment Game if there is a longer future ahead (dyadic control), but if receivers do not return enough they stop sending (dyadic learning). In early rounds, trustors send more if the trustees return more. While Cochard, Nguyen Van, and Willinger refer to this finding as a reciprocity effect, it can also be interpreted as a learning effect. Again, there is a strong endgame effect, although it is observed very late in the games. Trustees start to return less in the last-but-one round. Trustors react on low return rates by sending less in the last round, but there is no significant evidence that trustors send less as a pure result of being in the last round.
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Effects of network embeddedness
Experiments with Trust Games or Investment Games that include network embeddedness are still rare. Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004;  see also Bolton and Ockenfels 2009) compare one-shot Trust Games that are isolated encounters in the strict sense, finitely repeated Trust Games (with the same partner), and a third treatment in which subjects play multiple one-shot Trust Games with different partners but obtain information about the past behavior of their partners in interactions with other subjects (for a similar setup and results, see Bohnet and Huck 2004) . In the one-shot Trust Games, trust and trustworthiness decline quickly after subjects have some experience. Trust and trustworthiness remain high in the repeated Trust Games and collapse only in the last couple of rounds. This finding resonates with evidence on effects of dyadic embeddedness. In the third treatment, there is initially less trust and trustworthiness than in the finitely repeated Trust Game setting, but trustees apparently learn fast enough that they have a considerable problem if they do not honor trust. In this treatment, trust and trustworthiness stabilize for some time in the middle of the series of interactions, although at a somewhat lower level than in the repeated Trust Game setting. Again, trust collapses in the last few rounds. Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004) interpret their third treatment as an experimental implementation of an institutionalized reputation system that is common for on-line transactions. The treatment could also be interpreted as a complete network in which information diffusion is perfect. Below we will come back to this. Note that the Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels reputation treatment involves opportunities for learning as well as control through third parties. While indicating that network embeddedness matters, it remains unclear to which mechanism-learning or control or both-trust can be attributed. Buskens, Raub, and Van der Veer (2010) introduce a network setting with subjects playing finitely repeated Trust Games in groups of three (see also Barrera and Buskens 2009 for a related study on the Investment Game). There are two trustors and one trustee. Both trustors play with the same trustee. The design varies whether or not trustors obtain information about transactions from the other trustor who plays with the trustee. It turns out that there is more trust in the condition in which trustors do know what happens in the games of the other trustor. Similar to findings from other experiments, within dyads, trustors send more after positive experiences with the trustee, and trust as well as trustworthiness collapse near the end of the game. This is once again evidence for dyadic control, as well as dyadic learning. Buskens (2003) implies that the decrease in trust and trustworthiness should start later with increasing network embeddedness because of the network control effect. Buskens, Raub, and Van der Veer (2010) do not find evidence for this network control effect on the trust of the trustor. Still, they do find evidence for network control on trustworthiness of the trustee. They offer a bounded rationality argument why network control has an effect only for trustees and not for trustors: the trustee needs to anticipate third-party sanctions, while the trustor needs a further step of strategic reasoning-namely, anticipating that the trustee anticipates the third-party sanctions.
There is quite some qualitative evidence that dyadic embeddedness (for example, Uzzi 1996) and network embeddedness (for example, Wechsberg 1966) affect trust. We focus on more quantitative evidence from surveys. As we will see, although many surveys offer evidence for effects of embeddedness, it is hardly ever the case that we can determine whether the effects are the result of learning, control, or a combination of the two mechanisms. Gulati (1995a Gulati ( , 1995b employs data on strategic alliances between business firms. Such alliances typically involve incentives for opportunism and trust problems between the partners. He finds that the probability that firms will form alliances is larger if they have been previously involved in alliances with the same partner. Gulati interprets this as an indication that previous and presumably positive experiences enlarge trust among partners. Moreover, the probability that partners in alliances use equity as a formal governance mechanism and commitment device decreases with the number of previous alliances between the partners. Using other data, Gulati and Wang (2003) show that joint ventures with a longer positive relation generate more value than joint ventures with less dyadic embeddedness. This is another indication that dyadic embeddedness helps to reach more efficient solutions in the social dilemmas the partners face. More precisely, it is tempting to assume learning effects resulting from dyadic embeddedness as an underlying mechanism. Baker, Faulkner, and Fisher (1998) find that interorganizational ties between advertising agencies and their clients have a smaller probability of being dissolved if they have existed for a longer period. Although these findings are interpreted in terms of learningpositive past experience increases trust, while trust enlarges the probability of staying together-a control interpretation seems likewise plausible. After all, the increased probability of staying together improves control opportunities.
Effects of dyadic embeddedness
Some studies on trust in interfirm relations are noteworthy for addressing the effects of embeddedness at the dyadic level on the investment in formal arrangements such as investments in contracting. We consider investments in formal contractual arrangements as an indication for lack of trust among partners, since such arrangements provide, for example, compensation for the trustor in case of untrustworthy behavior by the trustee. This can also be interpreted as that there exist substitution effects between contracting and embeddedness in facilitating transactions that involve trust problems. In a study on seventy-two subcontracting relationships, Lyons (1994) finds that the probability for arranging the relationship with a formal contract decreases with the number of years subcontractors have been trading with their most important customers. Similarly, Corts and Singh (2004) find that repeated interactions between oil companies and off-shore drillers reduce the probability that they choose fixed-price contracts to arrange the transaction. Blumberg (1997: ch. 4 .2) uses the investment in formal arrangements and the extensiveness of the contract as measures for distrust in R&D-relations. He finds that both measures decrease and, thus, that trust increases with the extent to which the partners had transactions in the past. These results support the learning hypothesis that positive experiences increase trust. Blumberg actually distinguishes between the effect of past transactions and transactions expected with the partner in the future, but he does not find an effect of the transactions partners expect in the future. Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2003) study relations between buyers and suppliers of IT products. Their dependent variable is a combination of time and money spent in partner search, negotiating with the partner, and the extensiveness of the contract. This dependent variable represents investments in the ex-ante planning of transactions. They find that these investments decrease if the partners had transactions in the past. Furthermore, they find that the investments decrease even more if the partners already had past transactions and expect more transactions in the future. They do not find an effect of expected future transactions if the partners had no previous transactions. Their explanation employs two arguments. First, costly investments in ex-ante planning are less necessary if more future transactions are expected because of the sanction opportunities from subsequent transactions. This is a control effect based on the expectation of future transactions. Second, however, it is worthwhile to invest more in formal arrangements if more future transactions are expected, because these investments can be used again in subsequent transactions. This is an investment effect brought about by the expectation of future transactions. The driving force of this effect is that relation-specific investments associated with a focal transaction affect the incentive structure of future transactions. Combining the arguments on control and on the investment effect, it is unclear what the total effect of future transactions is. However, a negative interaction effect between past and future on ex-ante planning is indeed expected, since the investment effect will be larger in initial transactions than in later transactions. Another explanation for such an interaction effect could be that control plays a role only if the partners have sufficient information about each other and that uncertainties about an unknown partner are simply too large to allow for reliance on control through future sanctions already in the first transaction. Buskens, Raub, and Weesie (2000) use the same data as Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2003) . They address the effects of network embeddedness on trust. They find that there are fewer issues addressed in the contract if the buyer and supplier are located closer to each other. An interpretation of this finding is that buyers and suppliers who are located closer to each other are probably embedded in a denser network. Although alternative explanations might be possible, this is a first indication that network embeddedness increases trust. Obviously, being located close to one another improves learning as well as control opportunities, so that it is unclear whether this effect is the result of learning or control. Rooks, Raub, and Tazelaar (2006) also use the same data to study trustworthiness of the supplier by analyzing how many ex-post problems arise in an IT-transaction. They find evidence that fewer ex-post problems arise in a transaction if the buyer knows more other buyers of the supplier, if the supplier is more visible, and if the buyer has more alternative suppliers to choose from. While the first and the second effect can be interpreted as learning as well as control effects of network embeddedness, the third effect is a network control effect on trustworthiness of the supplier. This pattern of findings is consistent with the experiment of Buskens, Raub, and Van der Veer (2010) , showing that the control effect of network embeddedness is more apparent for the trustee's than for the trustor's behavior. Gulati (1995b) argues that social networks help firms to obtain information about facilities and the abilities of potential partners. He indeed finds that alliances occur more often among partners who have more common ties with third parties. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) is one of the studies which shows that specific network properties-in this case, centrality-are related to the likelihood of alliance formation. These findings can be interpreted as a result of learning as well as control effects of network embeddedness, because central actors potentially receive more information and they can also transmit information more widely in the network.
Effects of network embeddedness
Using data on strategic alliances in the biotechnology sector, Robinson and Stuart (2007) try to disentangle the effects of different mechanisms based on network embeddedness. Their dependent variable is equity participation, which is a measurement for mistrust, because it reduces incentive problems and increases formal control opportunities. Their important independent variables related to our study are the centrality of the trustor ("client") and trustee ("agent" or "target") in the network; third parties trustor and trustee share in the network; and past alliances among the two partners. Robinson and Stuart provide strong evidence for effects of dyadic embeddedness and network embeddedness on trust by explaining the use of informal network management mechanisms rather than equity participation for partners with repeated interactions, partners that are more central in the network, and partners that have more other partners in common. Again, however, it is impossible to distinguish clearly between learning and control effects, because Robinson and Stuart use centrality measures such that the ties considered are symmetric and can be used for sending as well as receiving information. Moreover, the evidence in these network studies is based on the assumption that the network structure related to actual alliances corresponds largely with the network structure of communication among the relevant firms. If this assumption does not hold, learning and control can be the result of ties other than the alliance ties. Thus these studies provide at best indirect evidence for the mechanisms implied by the theory, because there is no information on how actual information about behavior of the firms is spread among other firms.
The Internet economy confronts exchange partners with trust problems and illustrates how actors try to solve trust problems through institutionalized information exchange that improves network embeddedness in a setting in which direct face-to-face contact is not sufficient. An important advantage of studies on the Internet economy is that for transactions at eBay and other platforms, researchers know which information the buyers have about sellers. In addition, the large number of transactions provides good opportunities for quantitative analyses. Both selling probability and selling price can be interpreted as measures of trust. First, if trust is too low, the transaction will not take place. Second, a good reputation of the seller increases the buyer's trust and the expected value of the product for the buyer, implying that she is willing to pay more. In one of the earliest studies, Kollock (1999) claims preliminary evidence that reputation scores have an effect on price. Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) conclude from an overview of studies on eBay auctions that good reputation scores increase the likelihood that a product is sold, but that there is no evidence that reputation scores affect price.
In subsequent studies, various statistical pitfalls in the analyses of Internet auctions are addressed. Resnick et al. (2006) develop a field experiment in which they use an experienced seller who sells under different identities and with different reputation scores. In this way, they keep constant many confounding factors-for example, seller's experience. Indeed, they find a large price premium related to the better reputation score. Also, in their extensive review of existing empirical work, Resnick et al. show that the price effect becomes more apparent in the more sophisticated studies. In addition, Snijders and Zijdeman (2004) show that unobserved heterogeneity can obscure the effect of reputation on price (see also Diekmann, Jann, and Wyder 2009). Lucking-Reiley et al. (2007) find evidence that looking only at the net reputation score-that is, positive minus negative evaluations-is not sufficient, because negative evaluations have a much larger impact on the price than positive evaluations. Most data collected from eBay and other standard auction sites have another problem-namely, that they include information about completed deals, while there is no, or at best limited, information about the alternatives buyers had. This implies that the actual choice problem of buyers cannot be properly evaluated, which might lead to serious selection problems. Snijders and Weesie (2009) solve this problem by looking at a different type of site at which producers of software can offer their services for specific demands by the buyer. At the end of the auction, the buyer chooses a producer. Snijders and Weesie (ibid.) again find that better reputation scores have a positive effect on price.
The evidence on Internet auctions shows that institutionalized information exchange indeed improves trust of buyers in sellers. Clearly, this can be interpreted as a learning effect: positive past information convinces buyers that a seller will act in a trustworthy way. Still, institutionalized information exchange is likewise related to control through network embeddedness. Given that positive reputations have a price premium, buyers can damage reputations of sellers if sellers do not perform well. However, the evidence on how negative evaluations should be weighted against positive ones and whether negative evaluations have a larger negative impact on price for sellers with good reputations than for sellers with less well developed reputations is not so clear yet. Note that we do not address the question of why people provide feedback at all. Clearly, this involves a collective good dilemma in itself, since providing feedback is costly, while there is no direct benefit for oneself in providing feedback. Solving this dilemma would bring us into the literature on self-organizing institutions (see Ostrom 1990; and Janssen 2006 for a specific model related to Internet auctions).
The evidence on learning and control effects on trust through social networks or more formal institutions that facilitate information exchange is still far from conclusive. While there is evidence that trust can emerge in dense social networks, it remains unclear what drives the emergence of trust. Is it learning, or is control through the promise of positive and the threat of negative sanctions more important? Presumably, the empirical evidence is also limited because of scarce theoretical explanations that can guide the search for empirical evidence. Researchers have focused primarily on establishing the relationship between network embeddedness and trust considering at most one mechanism that drives this relationship. The distinction between learning and control effects of embeddedness proposed here and the fact that embeddedness facilitates learning as well as control, however, asks for an integrated approach that allows for disentangling these two mechanisms. Table 3 .3 offers a summary of key references to empirical research on embeddedness effects.
Distinguishing empirically between control and learning effects of embeddedness is a complex task. While laboratory experiments mostly allow variation in only a small number of variables, survey research often lacks the necessary control on causes and consequences. As a complement to lab experiments and survey studies, we discuss two vignette experiments in which subjects are presented with hypothetical economic transactions that involve trust problems. The subjects answer questions about their behavior related to these transactions (see Rossi and Nock 1982 on vignette experiments) . Vignette experiments are useful in providing more control over the variation of somewhat more key variables, as well as over what the causes of changes in the dependent variable are. In addition, in surveys and experiments, actors are engaged in series of transactions in which opportunities for learning and control often co-occur, while in vignette experiments it is more straightforward to vary opportunities for learning and control independently. These advantages of vignette designs, however, come with two disadvantages. First, the choices are purely hypothetical, which implies that the choices do not have actual consequences for the decision-makers. This questions the actual incentives to choose one or the other option. Second, given that the decision situations are hypothetical, it can be a problem that the decision situation is rather artificial for the decision-maker, which compromises the validity of the decisions.
In the vignette experiments, subjects have to imagine themselves in the role of buyers in economic transactions. The description of the situation makes it plausible that buyers face a trust problem by indicating that the transaction partner might have an incentive to behave opportunistically in the transaction.
In the first experiment, purchase managers of Dutch companies are asked to answer questions about hypothetical transactions with suppliers (see Rooks et al. 2000) . The description of the transactions comprises information about transaction characteristics such as price and specific investments of the buyer associated with the transaction, but also about the relationship of the buyer with the supplier. Four variables are varied that are related to embeddedness: (1) The extent to which the buyer did business with the same supplier in the past (dyadic learning); (2) The extent to which the buyer expects to do business with the supplier in the future (dyadic control); (3) The extent to which the buyer and supplier have common business partners (network embeddedness that provides opportunities for learning as well as control); and (4) The availability of alternative suppliers for the buyer (network control).
The dependent variable is lack of trust of the buyer, measured by the extent to which the buyer wants to invest in safeguards (for example, contractual agreements) before the transaction takes place. Results reveal a strong effect of embeddedness on trust resulting from learning within a dyadic relation. Positive past experiences reduce the investment in safeguards. Although there is no main effect of expected interactions in the future, there is indeed a negative interaction effect of past transactions and expected future transactions, indicating that the use of control opportunities is contingent on some previous learning opportunities. This finding is in line with the results of the survey on IT transactions of Batenburg, Raub, and Snijders (2003) discussed above, notably employing a very different research design. Concerning third-party effects, results show that knowing other business partners of the supplier increases trust. It is unclear whether this effect is the result of learning or control, since these third parties can be used to obtain information on previous behavior of the supplier, but they also can be informed on behavior of the supplier in the focal transaction, thus extending control opportunities for the buyer. There is indeed a negative effect of the availability of alternative trading partners on investments of the buyer in safeguards for the transaction. This supports the interpretation that purchase managers realize that alternative suppliers provide them with sanction opportunities, implying that suppliers are less likely to act in an untrustworthy way if they have more competitors.
In another vignette experiment, students are asked to compare situations for buying a used car (see Buskens and Weesie 2000b for more details). Students are offered pairs of vignettes describing such a transaction, and they are asked which one they prefer. Five embeddedness variables are varied at the vignettes: (1) Whether the buyer has bought a car from the dealer before and was satisfied, or never bought a car from the dealer (dyadic learning). (2) Whether or not the buyer expects to move to the other side of the country soon (dyadic control). The probability that the buyer has future transactions with the dealer is smaller if the buyer moves. Hence, control is more difficult for a buyer who moves. Theoretically, the effect of expected future transactions is based on the sanctions of the buyer anticipated by the dealer. Therefore, strictly speaking, expected future transactions can be expected to affect the behavior of buyer and dealer only if the dealer is informed about the buyer's plans to move. (3) Whether the dealer is or is not well known in the neighborhood of the buyer (network density). Again, learning as well as control of a well-known garage through the network of customers can be more effective than learning about or control of a garage that is not well known. (4) Whether or not the buyer has information from friends about transactions of these friends with the garage (network learning), with a focus on the difference between no information and positive information. (5) Whether or not both the buyer and the dealer are members of the same sports team (network control). This measures network control because the number of acquaintances the buyer and dealer have in common is expected to be larger if the buyer and dealer are members of the same sports team. Common membership provides the buyer with possibilities of controlling the dealer through positive or negative reputational sanctions both in business and as a team member. An advantage of this operationalization is that the theoretical assumption of "common knowledge about the network" is unlikely to be violated because the buyer and the dealer both know that they are members of the sports team.
Results show that all five embeddedness variables have positive effects on the likelihood that subjects prefer a vignette that includes the respective type of embeddedness over the one in which that type of embeddedness is not available. The strongest effects seem again to be those of dyadic and network learning variables. Positive information clearly enhances trust. Dyadic control, density, and network control likewise have positive effects on trust, which implies that control is important at the dyadic as well as at the network level. The evidence for a control mechanism is somewhat problematic, since these variables are subject to alternative explanations. There might be other disadvantages of buying a car just before you move, for example, because you need to find another garage if there is any problem with the car in the future. Although our arguments and results for network control are in accordance with DiMaggio and Louch (1998), we cannot exclude that actors prefer to trust well-known others over unknown others for other reasons than the control reasons advocated here.
Summarizing the evidence from studies employing different research designs, we have quite unambiguous support for hypotheses on learning effects at the dyadic and network level. Also, hypotheses on effects of control opportunities at the dyadic level are quite consistently supported, as can be seen from endgame effects in finitely repeated Trust Games, surveys on transactions as well as the vignette experiments. Network control is less well studied and the evidence is more ambiguous. We would expect that these results might generalize to other kinds of social dilemmas, but we do not know about systematic studies that have compared embeddedness effects for other social dilemmas, including experimental as well as survey studies and distinguishing between different types of embeddedness effects.
Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
We have provided a survey of rational choice research on social dilemmas by focusing on how game theory can be used to model social dilemmas, how testable hypotheses can be generated from game-theoretic models, and what empirical evidence tells us about those hypotheses. Trust problems have been our paradigm case of a social dilemma. In terms of the strategies for refining the model of atomized interactions on perfect markets of rational and selfish actors with full information, we have focused on models that retain the rationality assumption. In fact, game-theoretic models often employ particularly strong rationality assumptions. We have briefly considered how relaxing selfishness assumptions by including other-regarding preferences can help in accounting for behavior in social dilemmas and specifically in dilemmas that are isolated encounters. Our main focus, however, has been on effects of social embeddedness. We have concentrated on game-theoretic models that allow for an analysis of how embeddedness affects behavior in social dilemmas. Hence, the bulk of the models surveyed in this chapter relax the assumption of atomized interactions and often also the assumption of full information. We have stressed that game-theoretic models allow us to systematically distinguish different kinds of embeddedness and also to distinguish different mechanisms such as control and learning through which behavior in social dilemmas depends on embeddedness.
From the empirical end, we have stressed the need for research designs that make possible discrimination between different types of embeddedness, as well as disentangling control and learning effects. We have also argued for using complementary research designs such as experiments, surveys, vignette studies, and the like as a strategy for establishing the robustness of empirical findings (see Levitt and List 2007 for a thorough discussion of this issue, as well as Heckman 2009 and Gächter and Thöni 2011) . Our overview of studies shows that there is quite some empirical evidence for embeddedness effects. When research designs are employed that do allow for disentangling different kinds of embeddedness effects and mechanisms through which embeddedness works, hypotheses based on game-theoretic models often succeed in predicting the signs of coefficients (see Grofman 1993; Green and Shapiro 1994 for related discussions on the merits and problems of qualitative predictions on changes "at the margin" using comparative statics versus quantitative point predictions from rational choice models). Nevertheless, there is clearly much room for improvement in the predictions of game-theoretic models on behavior in social dilemmas. Roughly speaking, the overall impression is that assuming game-theoretic rationality as well as selfish actors ("utility = own money") cannot account for quite some nonopportunistic behavior in social dilemmas that are isolated encounters, while it also often predicts "too much" cooperative behavior in repeated social dilemmas (see Bolton and Ockenfels 2009 for a similar point in the context of research on reputation systems in the Internet economy). Developing game-theoretic models on the interplay of social embeddedness and other-regarding preferences may be useful in this respect (see Gintis 2000: ch. 11 for related arguments).
With respect to research on social embeddedness, theoretical as well as empirical work reviewed in this chapter assumed embeddedness characteristics as exogenously given. Using a notion that has become popular, embeddedness can be conceived as social capital of actors (see, for example, Coleman 1990). We have focused on the returns on social capital: embeddedness allows for overcoming Pareto-suboptimal outcomes in social dilemmas. What we have neglected are actors' investments in their social capital (see Flap 2004 and the chapter by Flap and Völker in this Handbook for the distinction between returns on and investments in social capital). However, given the returns on embeddedness in social dilemmas, actors do have an incentive to invest in their embeddedness by strategically establishing, maintaining, or deleting ties to others, including search for potential interaction partners. One would thus like to endogenize embeddedness characteristics. Research on strategic network formation based on game-theoretic models is rather novel but meanwhile rapidly developing (see the textbooks Goyal 2007; Jackson 2008) . Such work on returns on and investments in social capital can likewise benefit from the development of "actor-driven" statistical models for the dynamics ("coevolution") of networks and behavior (see Snijders 2001; Snijders's chapter in this Handbook).
How embeddedness can contribute to trust and cooperation has been a core topic of our chapter. We have thus highlighted the beneficial effects of embeddedness for the actors involved in a social dilemma. Beneficial effects for the actors directly involved can have negative effects for others. From the perspective of third parties or from a societal perspective, undermining rather than fostering cooperation is often the aim. It should be noted, too, that embeddedness can also have adverse effects for the actors who are themselves directly involved in social dilemmas. Focusing on learning and information diffusion rather than game-theoretic rationality as a driving force of behavior, Burt and Knez (1995) have shown that dense networks can amplify trust as well as distrust. The core argument is that because of the homogeneity of opinions in a dense network, actors become convinced about some information because they receive the information disproportionately often. Coethnics may be able to solve trust problems in economic exchange by transacting with each other, but this may lead to entrapment and missing opportunities from outside networks (see, for example, Portes 1998). Flache (2002) offers a game-theoretic model of how informal social ties between the members of a team can undermine cooperation between the members of the team since they have to trade off the benefits of sanctioning team members who do not cooperate against the costs of deteriorating informal social ties through negative sanctions. While there is quite some empirical research on adverse effects of embeddedness, more systematic theoretical modeling of such effects is needed.
With respect to theoretical modeling, relaxing strong game-theoretic rationality assumptions or showing that and when equilibrium behavior in accordance with such assumptions is a-possibly long-term-result of bounded rationality and evolutionary or learning processes (for example, Fudenberg and Levine 1998; Gintis 2000) may have useful implications for research on social dilemmas, too. We would like to conclude, though, with a more specific suggestion. We have seen that, in principle, games with incomplete information are a tool for analyzing embeddedness effects in social dilemmas through control and learning in an integrated way. However, as we have also seen, it is difficult to strike a fruitful balance of analytic tractability and realistic assumptions about what information actors have and how they use relevant sources of information. On the one hand, models with more realistic informational assumptions are often difficult to analyze. On the other, knowledge about what realistic informational assumptions would be is limited, because most empirical research has not succeeded in clearly disentangling the effects of learning and control mechanisms. Disentangling the effects could provide some evidence on the relative importance of these mechanisms and evidence about changes in the importance of different effects related to different circumstances.
To overcome these limitations, we propose a two-step empirical and theoretical approach. More experimental research is necessary to obtain better insights in the relative importance of the different mechanisms. For example, experiments should be designed such that subjects are involved in abstract Trust Games embedded in a social context that allows for communication among trustors. The experiments should explicitly provide insights in how subjects use information they obtain from other subjects in the network and whether or not they try to sanction by informing other trustors in the network. In this way, the experiments make possible the development of new models built on assumptions, for example, about information exchange that have an empirical basis rather than on assumptions chosen exclusively on the basis of introspection of researchers and mathematical tractability. Moreover, the experiments can be used to obtain initial insights in circumstances that affect the importance of control versus learning. The results of such experiments can inspire new theoretical models on the relative effects of learning versus control. Based on these models, survey designs can then be developed that allow for variations in learning and control variables such that the predicted effects can be distinguished.
Notes
The order of authorship is alphabetical. Stimulating comments of and discussions with Jeroen Weesie and other members of our Utrecht group, Cooperation in Social and Economic Relations, are gratefully acknowledged. We also acknowledge helpful comments from participants of the Rational Choice Social Research Workshop and specifically from our discussant, Simon Gächter. 1. See Ostrom (2003) for first steps toward a theoretical framework combining both strategies.
2. For a textbook accessible to readers with modest training in formal theoretical model building and no prior exposure to game theory, see Rasmusen (2007) .
3. In contrast, the expression derived for the temptation in isolated encounters using guilt incorporates also the trustor's payoff S 1 .
4. Coleman, in his meanwhile classic sketch, clearly intuited this result when he argued that an important feature of socialization is "coming to see the long-term consequences to oneself of particular strategies of action," rather than the internalization of norms (1964: 180) . Voss (1982) seems to be the first sociologist who realized explicitly that the theory of repeated games has important implications for the problem of order and cooperation in social dilemmas.
5. One might argue that learning is still possible in these models, since there are many equilibria and it is not clear why actors should choose the same equilibrium to start with. We disregard this issue, assuming that actors coordinate instantly on the same equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Levine 1998: 20) .
6. There are sizable parallel literatures on experiments with repeated social dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma (see Dawes 1980; Colman 1982: ch. 7 ; Sally 1995 for overviews), Public Goods Games (overview: Ledyard 1995) , and still other strategic interactions (overview : Camerer 2003) .
7. Experiments employing the closely related Gift-Exchange Game ( Van der Heijden et al. 2001; Gächter and Falk 2002) likewise show that repeated play increases the efficiency of outcomes and that endgame effects occur in a similar manner.
